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Translating ​ ​the ​ ​Local ​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Global:​ ​Microfinance​ ​in​ ​Hyderabad,​ ​India 
 
Since ​ ​the ​ ​early ​ ​1980s, ​ ​the ​ ​poor ​ ​in ​ ​and ​ ​around​ ​the​ ​city​ ​of​ ​Hyderabad,​ ​India​ ​have​ ​been 
incorporated ​ ​into ​ ​expanding ​ ​financial​ ​networks​ ​through​ ​microfinance​ ​institutions.​ ​According​ ​to 
business ​ ​insiders ​ ​and ​ ​development ​ ​planners,​ ​microfinance​ ​institutions​ ​(MFIs)​ ​provide​ ​access​ ​to 
financial ​ ​services,​ ​like ​ ​credit ​ ​and ​ ​insurance,​ ​to​ ​those​ ​positioned​ ​at​ ​the​ ​margins​ ​of​ ​the​ ​financial 
world. ​ ​Providing ​ ​small ​ ​loans​ ​to​ ​aspiring​ ​entrepreneurs​ ​in​ ​the​ ​“developing​ ​world,”​ ​microfinance 
has ​ ​been ​ ​praised ​ ​as​ ​a ​ ​grassroots​ ​alternative​ ​to​ ​large-scale​ ​development​ ​strategies​ ​like​ ​structural 
adjustment ​ ​policies ​ ​(Associated​ ​Press ​ ​2012).​ ​Instead​ ​of​ ​working​ ​through​ ​the​ ​formal​ ​and 
state-regulated ​ ​economy,​ ​microfinance ​ ​embraces ​ ​the​ ​informal​ ​economy—the​ ​everyday 
entrepreneurial ​ ​activities ​ ​that ​ ​happen ​ ​on​ ​a​ ​“local”​ ​level​ ​(Elychar​ ​2002:​ ​493-495).​ ​While 
continually ​ ​hailed ​ ​as ​ ​an ​ ​innovative ​ ​generator​ ​of​ ​“development​ ​from ​ ​below,”​ ​microfinance​ ​has​ ​a 
complex ​ ​and ​ ​violent ​ ​presence​ ​in​ ​India, ​ ​particularly​ ​in​ ​the​ ​rural​ ​areas​ ​outside​ ​of​ ​Hyderabad.  
This ​ ​paper ​ ​will ​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​the​ ​discursive ​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​“the​ ​poor”​ ​have​ ​been​ ​enfolded​ ​into 
seemingly ​ ​global ​ ​financial ​ ​markets​ ​through​ ​microfinance​ ​“projects.”​ ​By ​ ​projects,​ ​I​ ​refer ​ ​to​ ​Anna 
Tsing’s ​ ​analytical ​ ​unit: ​ ​“relatively​ ​coherent​ ​bundles ​ ​of​ ​ideas ​ ​and​ ​practices ​ ​as​ ​realized​ ​in 
particular ​ ​times ​ ​and ​ ​places”​ ​(Tsing​ ​2000:​ ​85).​ ​Breaking​ ​down​ ​microfinance​ ​into​ ​a​ ​series​ ​of 
“globalist ​ ​projects” ​ ​interrupts ​ ​the ​ ​totalizing​ ​scales,​ ​ideologies,​ ​and​ ​systems​ ​that​ ​globalization 
theory ​ ​usually​ ​takes ​ ​up. ​ ​Instead​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​processual​ ​term“globalization,”​ ​which​ ​assumes​ ​a​ ​growing 
globality, ​ ​Tsing’s ​ ​term ​ ​“globalist”​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​a​ ​rhetorical​ ​endorsement​ ​of​ ​the​ ​imagined​ ​global​ ​scale 
(Tsing ​ ​2000: ​ ​69). ​ ​In ​ ​Hyderabad, ​ ​I​ ​consider​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​the​ ​microfinance​ ​institution,​ ​SKS 
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Microfinance ​ ​Limited​ ​(recently​ ​renamed​ ​Bharat​ ​Financial​ ​Inclusion​ ​LTD)​ ​as ​ ​one​ ​such​ ​globalist 
project. ​ ​As ​ ​a ​ ​globalist ​ ​project,​ ​SKS​ ​reveals​ ​much​ ​about​ ​the​ ​ways ​ ​in​ ​which​ ​commercial 
institutions ​ ​mobilize​ ​and ​ ​reinforce​ ​scales ​ ​like​ ​“local”​ ​and​ ​“global”​ ​to​ ​expand​ ​their​ ​reach​ ​and 
consolidate ​ ​their ​ ​financial ​ ​subjects.  
In ​ ​order ​ ​to​ ​think ​ ​about ​ ​SKS ​ ​as ​ ​a​ ​situated​ ​collection​ ​of​ ​ideas​ ​and​ ​practices,​ ​I​ ​will​ ​look 
toward ​ ​the ​ ​deeply ​ ​politicized​ ​history​ ​of​ ​SKS​ ​microfinance​ ​in​ ​Hyderabad​ ​and​ ​their​ ​more​ ​recent 
2014 ​ ​advertising ​ ​campaign ​ ​that ​ ​enframes​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​client:​ ​poor​ ​rural​ ​women.​ ​SKS’s 
history ​ ​reveals ​ ​a ​ ​determined​ ​trajectory​ ​of​ ​corporatization—from ​ ​1997​ ​to​ ​2010,​ ​the​ ​company 
steadily ​ ​shifted ​ ​from ​ ​an ​ ​NGO​ ​to​ ​a ​ ​for-profit​ ​public​ ​corporation.​ ​Following​ ​Ira​ ​Bashkow,​ ​I​ ​will 
argue ​ ​that ​ ​under ​ ​the ​ ​peculiar​ ​ownership ​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​corporation,​ ​SKS​ ​abandoned 
earlier ​ ​safety​ ​measures ​ ​in ​ ​order​ ​to​ ​meet ​ ​the​ ​constant​ ​demands​ ​of​ ​finance​ ​capital​ ​(Bashkow​ ​2008). 
In ​ ​a ​ ​quest ​ ​for​ ​growth,​ ​the ​ ​company ​ ​farmed​ ​out​ ​bigger​ ​and​ ​riskier​ ​loans—endangering​ ​the​ ​lives​ ​of 
borrowers ​ ​and ​ ​employees.​ ​In​ ​this​ ​expansion,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​constant​ ​tension​ ​between​ ​the​ ​abstraction 
of ​ ​“global” ​ ​finance​ ​and ​ ​the ​ ​embodied​ ​reality​ ​of​ ​localized​ ​borrowing​ ​and​ ​lending. 
This ​ ​movement ​ ​between ​ ​the ​ ​discursive ​ ​scales​ ​of​ ​local​ ​and​ ​global​ ​is​ ​again​ ​replicated​ ​in​ ​the 
company’s ​ ​more ​ ​recent ​ ​re-organization ​ ​as​ ​Bharat​ ​Financial​ ​Inclusion​ ​Ltd.​ ​Their ​ ​updated​ ​website 
and ​ ​2014 ​ ​advertising ​ ​campaign ​ ​attempts​ ​to​ ​consolidate​ ​poor​ ​rural​ ​women​ ​as​ ​disciplined​ ​credit 
subjects ​ ​(BFIL ​ ​Website, ​ ​n.d.).​ ​In ​ ​their​ ​image​ ​making,​ ​the​ ​company​ ​exerts ​ ​their​ ​own​ ​form ​ ​of 
governmentality ​ ​over ​ ​their ​ ​clients—inscribing​ ​rural​ ​women​ ​in​ ​India​ ​with​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of ​ ​characteristics 
that ​ ​signify ​ ​and ​ ​reproduce ​ ​a​ ​self-disciplined​ ​“Third​ ​World”​ ​entrepreneur.​ ​Translating​ ​between 
two ​ ​sets ​ ​of ​ ​clients, ​ ​the ​ ​company’s ​ ​advertising​ ​works​ ​on​ ​multiple​ ​levels ​ ​to​ ​discipline​ ​“local” 
Indian ​ ​borrowers ​ ​and ​ ​attract​ ​“global”​ ​investors.​ ​By​ ​examining​ ​both​ ​the​ ​history​ ​of​ ​SKS​ ​in 
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Hyderabad ​ ​and ​ ​their​ ​current ​ ​discursive ​ ​practices,​ ​I​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​show​ ​how​ ​microfinance​ ​mobilizes 
particular ​ ​configurations ​ ​of​ ​scale ​ ​to​ ​conceptualize​ ​and​ ​represent​ ​their ​ ​business​ ​practices.​ ​Part​ ​of 
their ​ ​globalist ​ ​project, ​ ​then, ​ ​must​ ​be ​ ​understood​ ​as ​ ​the​ ​act​ ​of​ ​making​ ​and​ ​remaking​ ​specific​ ​units 
of ​ ​measurement ​ ​such ​ ​as ​ ​local, ​ ​global, ​ ​rural,​ ​and​ ​urban.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​making​ ​of​ ​these​ ​rhetorical​ ​scales, 
we ​ ​can ​ ​locate ​ ​a ​ ​paradoxical ​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​the​ ​corporate​ ​abstraction​ ​of​ ​microfinance​ ​and 
the ​ ​embodied ​ ​condition ​ ​of ​ ​indebtedness—as​ ​microfinance​ ​institutions​ ​abstract​ ​their ​ ​loans​ ​from 
the ​ ​material ​ ​world, ​ ​the ​ ​physical​ ​body ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​indebted​ ​client​ ​is ​ ​refigured​ ​as ​ ​collateral​ ​for​ ​the​ ​loan. 
Ultimately, ​ ​in ​ ​the​ ​translation ​ ​between ​ ​these​ ​scales,​ ​we​ ​find​ ​a​ ​messy​ ​and​ ​violent​ ​(corpo)reality 
that ​ ​contradicts ​ ​the ​ ​professed ​ ​aspirations ​ ​of​ ​microfinance​ ​initiatives.  
Going ​ ​Public: ​ ​Expansion,​ ​Risk, ​ ​and ​ ​Violence 
In ​ ​1997, ​ ​SKS ​ ​was ​ ​formed​ ​as ​ ​an​ ​NGO ​ ​under ​ ​the​ ​Grameen​ ​Bank​ ​model​ ​and​ ​began​ ​their 
operations ​ ​in ​ ​the ​ ​Medak ​ ​district​ ​of​ ​Andhra​ ​Pradesh​ ​(BFIL ​ ​2009:​ ​“About​ ​Us”).​ ​This ​ ​model, 
originally ​ ​formulated​ ​by ​ ​​Nobel ​ ​Peace​ ​Prize​ ​winner ​ ​Muhammad ​ ​Yunus,​ ​was​ ​founded​ ​on​ ​the 
premise ​ ​of ​ ​small ​ ​group ​ ​loans. ​ ​Under​ ​this ​ ​model,​ ​development​ ​agencies​ ​and​ ​commercial​ ​banks 
provide ​ ​small​ ​loans ​ ​of ​  ​​ ​Rs.​ ​5,000-20,000 ​ ​($100-400) ​ ​to​ ​women ​ ​in​ ​groups​ ​of​ ​10-30​ ​people,​ ​with 
an ​ ​interest ​ ​rate ​ ​ranging ​ ​from ​ ​20​ ​to​ ​30 ​ ​percent​ ​(Kar ​ ​2013:​ ​481).​ ​The​ ​group​ ​lending​ ​structure​ ​that 
Yunus ​ ​formulated ​ ​was ​ ​prized ​ ​for ​ ​its ​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​shift​ ​the​ ​burden​ ​of​ ​debt​ ​recovery​ ​from​ ​the 
company ​ ​to​ ​the ​ ​borrowers. ​ ​In​ ​her​ ​work ​ ​on​ ​loan​ ​officers​ ​in​ ​Kolkata,​ ​​Sohini ​​ ​Kar​ ​points ​ ​out​ ​that​ ​the 
embedding ​ ​of ​ ​loans​ ​within ​ ​local​ ​social ​ ​relations​ ​allows​ ​microfinance​ ​to​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​social​ ​rather​ ​than 
material ​ ​capital ​ ​as ​ ​collateral ​ ​(Kar​ ​2013: ​ ​481).​ ​Here,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​see​ ​how​ ​microfinance 
mobilizes ​ ​“local” ​ ​social ​ ​relations ​ ​as ​ ​a​ ​vehicle​ ​for ​ ​spreading​ ​and​ ​embedding​ ​financial​ ​networks 
within ​ ​new ​ ​communities.  
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Following ​ ​Yunus’ ​ ​footsteps, ​ ​in​ ​1997, ​ ​Vikram ​ ​Akula​ ​founded​ ​Swayam ​ ​Krishi​ ​Sangam 
(SKS)— ​ ​Sanskrit ​ ​for ​ ​"self-help ​ ​society” ​ ​(Associated​ ​Press ​ ​2012).​ ​While​ ​originating​ ​as​ ​an​ ​NGO, 
SKS​ ​quickly​ ​shifted​ ​to​ ​a ​ ​for-profit,​ ​Non-Banking​ ​Financial​ ​Company​ ​(NBFC) ​ ​in​ ​2005.​ ​As ​ ​an 
NBFC-MFI, ​ ​the ​ ​company​ ​became​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​state​ ​regulations​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Reserve​ ​Bank​ ​of​ ​India, 
while ​ ​also ​ ​incorporating ​ ​new​ ​investors​ ​and​ ​commercial​ ​banking​ ​agencies​ ​(BFIL​ ​website).​ ​This 
shift ​ ​was ​ ​not ​ ​unique ​ ​to ​ ​SKS,​ ​but​ ​rather ​ ​fits​ ​into​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​trend​ ​in​ ​microfinance.​ ​Kar ​ ​writes, 
“although ​ ​originally ​ ​a​ ​grassroots​ ​movement,​ ​for-profit​ ​MFIs​ ​now​ ​raise​ ​capital​ ​through​ ​extensive 
financial ​ ​networks,​ ​accessing​ ​loans ​ ​from​ ​commercial​ ​banks,​ ​and​ ​issuing​ ​corporate​ ​bonds ​ ​and 
shares ​ ​of ​ ​private ​ ​and ​ ​public​ ​equity”​ ​(Kar​ ​2013:​ ​481).​ ​Abandoning​ ​its​ ​grassroots​ ​origins,​ ​SKS 
gradually ​ ​embraced​ ​a ​ ​market-oriented ​ ​model​ ​that​ ​relied​ ​increasingly​ ​on​ ​a​ ​wide​ ​range​ ​of 
commercial ​ ​and ​ ​state-run ​ ​banks​ ​and​ ​investors.​ ​Companies​ ​and​ ​foundations​ ​like​ ​CITIBANK, 
Silicon ​ ​Valley​ ​Bank, ​ ​the ​ ​Ford ​ ​Foundation,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Bill​ ​and​ ​Melinda​ ​Gates​ ​Foundation​ ​are​ ​listed 
as ​ ​major ​ ​investors​ ​and ​ ​supporters ​ ​on​ ​their​ ​website.​ ​Finally,​ ​in​ ​2010,​ ​SKS​ ​went​ ​public​ ​on​ ​the 
Bombay ​ ​Stock​ ​exchange ​ ​(Associated ​ ​Press​ ​2012). 
That ​ ​same ​ ​year, ​ ​150​ ​demonstrators​ ​surrounded​ ​the​ ​SKS​ ​headquarters​ ​in​ ​Hyderabad​ ​to 
protest ​ ​the ​ ​suicide​ ​of​ ​a ​ ​borrower’s ​ ​husband​ ​(Kinetz​ ​2012).​ ​Demanding​ ​$20,000​ ​in​ ​reparations, 
the ​ ​protestors​ ​threatened ​ ​to​ ​drag​ ​the​ ​victim’s​ ​corpse​ ​inside​ ​the​ ​corporate​ ​headquarters.​ ​While 
SKS​ ​did ​ ​not​ ​respond​ ​to​ ​the ​ ​protests,​ ​state​ ​authorities​ ​from ​ ​the​ ​RBI​ ​began​ ​investigating​ ​the 
company’s ​ ​lending ​ ​practices​ ​(Mohan​ ​& ​ ​Siddharth​ ​2011:​ ​5).​ ​In​ ​2012,​ ​more​ ​media​ ​reports​ ​again 
began ​ ​to ​ ​surface ​ ​around ​ ​Hyderabad: ​ ​that ​ ​borrowers,​ ​entangled​ ​in​ ​compounding​ ​networks ​ ​of​ ​debt, 
were ​ ​committing ​ ​suicide ​ ​(cite).​ ​A ​ ​private ​ ​investigation​ ​commissioned​ ​by​ ​SKS​ ​themselves​ ​linked 
their ​ ​employees ​ ​to​ ​seven ​ ​suicides, ​ ​though​ ​the​ ​reports​ ​were​ ​never​ ​made​ ​public​ ​(Associated​ ​Press 
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2012). ​ ​The ​ ​internal​ ​reports ​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​SKS​ ​loan​ ​officers​ ​routinely​ ​harassed​ ​defaulting 
borrowers; ​ ​loan ​ ​officers ​ ​forced ​ ​borrowers​ ​to​ ​pawn​ ​valuables,​ ​some ​ ​officers​ ​incited​ ​public 
shaming, ​ ​while ​ ​other ​ ​officers ​ ​grouped ​ ​together​ ​to​ ​verbally​ ​or​ ​physically​ ​threaten​ ​borrowers.​ ​The 
reports ​ ​tell ​ ​grim ​ ​stories ​ ​of​ ​cruel ​ ​loan​ ​officers ​ ​forcing​ ​the​ ​borrowers ​ ​either​ ​directly​ ​or​ ​indirectly 
toward ​ ​suicide. ​ ​According​ ​to​ ​the​ ​reports,​ ​one​ ​woman​ ​drank​ ​pesticide​ ​after​ ​an​ ​SKS​ ​debt​ ​collector 
told ​ ​a ​ ​borrower ​ ​to ​ ​prostitute​ ​her​ ​daughters​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​off​ ​a​ ​debt,​ ​which​ ​had​ ​reached​ ​over​ ​15,000 
rupees ​ ​or ​ ​around ​ ​3,000​ ​dollars. ​ ​In ​ ​another​ ​case,​ ​a​ ​woman​ ​drowned​ ​herself ​ ​in​ ​a​ ​pond​ ​after ​ ​a​ ​loan 
officer ​ ​advised ​ ​her​ ​that ​ ​suicide​ ​would ​ ​waive​ ​her​ ​compounding​ ​debt​ ​(Associated​ ​Press ​ ​2012). 
Whether ​ ​true ​ ​or ​ ​not,​ ​the​ ​report,​ ​commissioned​ ​by​ ​SKS​ ​themselves,​ ​links​ ​the​ ​suicides​ ​to 
the ​ ​cruel ​ ​actions ​ ​of ​ ​loan ​ ​officers, ​ ​not ​ ​the ​ ​structural​ ​conditions ​ ​of​ ​microfinance​ ​and​ ​group​ ​lending. 
In ​ ​many ​ ​media ​ ​reports, ​ ​the​ ​suicides​ ​were ​ ​similarly​ ​registered​ ​as​ ​direct​ ​consequences​ ​of 
aggressive ​ ​loan ​ ​collectors ​ ​and ​ ​not ​ ​the ​ ​overall​ ​model​ ​of ​ ​microfinance.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​Guardian,​ ​the​ ​BBC, 
and ​ ​the ​ ​New ​ ​York ​ ​Times, ​ ​articles​ ​point​ ​to​ ​“aggressive​ ​debt​ ​collection,”​ ​the​ ​ominous​ ​and 
constant ​ ​presence ​ ​of ​ ​money ​ ​lenders,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​“coercive​ ​microcredit​ ​agents”​ ​(Bajaj​ ​2011;​ ​Biswas 
2010; ​ ​Burke ​ ​2011).​ ​Thus,​ ​while ​ ​loan​ ​officers​ ​were​ ​framed​ ​as ​ ​criminals,​ ​the​ ​company​ ​defended 
its ​ ​original ​ ​microfinance ​ ​model. ​ ​Akula​ ​told​ ​India’s ​ ​Business​ ​Today,​ ​“Whatever​ ​happened​ ​was 
due ​ ​to ​ ​external ​ ​factors ​ ​and ​ ​was ​ ​not ​ ​reflective​ ​of​ ​any​ ​fundamental​ ​flaw​ ​in​ ​our ​ ​model”​ ​(Associated 
Press ​ ​2012). ​ ​Alok ​ ​Prasad,​ ​the​ ​chief ​ ​executive​ ​of​ ​Microfinance​ ​Institutions​ ​Network,​ ​commented 
to ​ ​Business ​ ​Insider, ​ ​“At ​ ​the​ ​end​ ​of​ ​it ​ ​you​ ​come ​ ​down​ ​to​ ​a​ ​handful​ ​of​ ​cases​ ​where​ ​some​ ​things 
went ​ ​wrong.​ ​Is​ ​that​ ​indicative ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​model​ ​being​ ​bad​ ​or ​ ​very​ ​rapid​ ​expansion​ ​leading​ ​to​ ​a​ ​loss​ ​of 
control?” ​ ​(Associated ​ ​Press ​ ​2012).  
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When ​ ​looking ​ ​at ​ ​SKS’​ ​history​ ​it​ ​becomes​ ​evident​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​precisely​ ​the​ ​structural 
pressures ​ ​of ​ ​corporatization​ ​that​ ​jeopardized​ ​the​ ​lives​ ​of​ ​borrowers.​ ​As​ ​SKS​ ​corporatized,​ ​they 
were ​ ​increasingly ​ ​subjected ​ ​to ​ ​the ​ ​financial​ ​demands​ ​of ​ ​top​ ​investors​ ​and​ ​shareholders.​ ​With 
corporatization, ​ ​micro-loans​ ​became​ ​reinsured​ ​by​ ​various​ ​commercial​ ​insurance​ ​companies.​ ​This 
meant ​ ​that ​ ​when ​ ​defaulting ​ ​borrowers​ ​committed​ ​suicide,​ ​the​ ​outstanding​ ​amount​ ​would​ ​be 
reimbursed ​ ​to​ ​SKS ​ ​and​ ​the ​ ​company ​ ​would​ ​stop​ ​seeking​ ​repayments ​ ​from ​ ​the​ ​indebted​ ​borrower 
(Mohan ​ ​& ​ ​Siddharth ​ ​2011: ​ ​6). ​ ​As​ ​investors​ ​demanded​ ​growth,​ ​loans​ ​became​ ​increasingly 
abstracted ​ ​from ​ ​the ​ ​embodied ​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​debt,​ ​even​ ​as​ ​the​ ​physical​ ​bodies​ ​of​ ​borrowers 
became ​ ​a ​ ​crucial ​ ​form ​ ​of ​ ​collateral. ​ ​This ​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​financial​ ​abstraction​ ​and​ ​corporeal 
violence ​ ​highlights​ ​the ​ ​complex​ ​structure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​public​ ​corporation.​ ​​Ira ​ ​Bashkow​ ​writes:  
Careful ​ ​analysis ​ ​shows ​ ​that​ ​what​ ​really​ ​defines​ ​the​ ​public​ ​corporation​ ​is ​ ​its​ ​peculiar 
ownership ​ ​structure ​ ​that​ ​differs​ ​radically ​ ​from ​ ​conventional​ ​private​ ​property,​ ​dividing 
the ​ ​rights ​ ​and​ ​obligations ​ ​traditionally​ ​agglomerated​ ​in​ ​western​ ​law​ ​into​ ​arcane 
components​ ​and ​ ​distributing​ ​them ​ ​in​ ​a ​ ​way​ ​that​ ​conforms​ ​as ​ ​closely​ ​as ​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​the 
desiderata ​ ​of ​ ​investment​ ​and​ ​trade​ ​on ​ ​public​ ​financial​ ​markets.​ ​(Bashkow​ ​2008:​ ​36) 
 
The ​ ​corporation’s ​ ​relationship ​ ​to​ ​financial​ ​markets​ ​“disarticulates”​ ​the​ ​corporation​ ​from ​ ​society, 
and ​ ​subsequently ​ ​from ​ ​a ​ ​“moral​ ​economy​ ​of​ ​relationship”​ ​(Bashkow​ ​2008:​ ​36).​ ​Alienated 
growth ​ ​becomes ​ ​the​ ​ultimate​ ​objective;​ ​the​ ​quality​ ​of​ ​the​ ​product​ ​(in​ ​this​ ​case​ ​loans)​ ​and​ ​the 
welfare ​ ​of ​ ​employees ​ ​and​ ​clients​ ​becomes​ ​secondary​ ​or​ ​even​ ​unimportant​ ​as ​ ​publicly​ ​traded 
corporations ​ ​are ​ ​subject ​ ​to ​ ​the ​ ​discipline ​ ​of ​ ​the​ ​stock​ ​market​ ​while​ ​the​ ​salaries​ ​of​ ​those​ ​in 
management ​ ​are ​ ​tied ​ ​directly ​ ​to​ ​share ​ ​price.  
The ​ ​company’s​ ​website, ​ ​geared​ ​almost​ ​exclusively​ ​towards​ ​investors,​ ​emphasizes​ ​their 
market-oriented ​ ​model. ​ ​In ​ ​the ​ ​section ​ ​“Our​ ​Work”​ ​they​ ​write:  
Many ​ ​believe ​ ​that ​ ​microfinance​ ​should ​ ​be​ ​a​ ​‘social​ ​business,’​ ​meaning​ ​investors ​ ​should 
get ​ ​their ​ ​investment​ ​back ​ ​but ​ ​no​ ​profits. ​ ​BFIL​ ​has​ ​a​ ​different​ ​view.​ ​If​ ​the​ ​microfinance 
industry ​ ​is​ ​going ​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​the​ ​estimated ​ ​INR ​ ​2,399.35​ ​billion​ ​(USD​ ​51.4​ ​billion)​ ​of 
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credit​ ​needed ​ ​by ​ ​the​ ​poor, ​ ​it​ ​must​ ​tap ​ ​commercial​ ​capital​ ​markets ​ ​–​ ​and​ ​that​ ​means 
structuring​ ​microfinance​ ​so​ ​that​ ​investors ​ ​can​ ​expect​ ​a​ ​return​ ​on​ ​their​ ​investment.​ ​(BFIL 
2009)  
 
This ​ ​type ​ ​of ​ ​venture ​ ​capitalist ​ ​model ​ ​was​ ​further​ ​reflected​ ​in​ ​their​ ​2008​ ​re-organization​ ​where 
the ​ ​company ​ ​replaced ​ ​the​ ​board ​ ​with​ ​top​ ​executives​ ​from ​ ​the​ ​financial​ ​world;​ ​California-based 
Sequoia ​ ​Capital ​ ​became ​ ​the​ ​company’s ​ ​largest​ ​shareholder​ ​and​ ​the​ ​Boston-based​ ​Sandstone 
Capital ​ ​became ​ ​major ​ ​investors​ ​(BFIL​ ​Website,​ ​n.d.).​ ​Providing​ ​powerful​ ​material​ ​incentives​ ​to 
managers ​ ​and ​ ​loan ​ ​officers,​ ​the​ ​public ​ ​company​ ​became ​ ​the​ ​fastest​ ​growing​ ​microfinance 
company ​ ​in​ ​the ​ ​word; ​ ​they ​ ​had ​ ​enfolded ​ ​over​ ​6.8​ ​million​ ​borrowers ​ ​into​ ​their​ ​financial​ ​network 
and ​ ​disbursed ​ ​3.2 ​ ​million ​ ​dollars ​ ​in​ ​loans​ ​(cite).​ ​At​ ​the​ ​same ​ ​time,​ ​the​ ​company​ ​began​ ​selling 
pools ​ ​of ​ ​microloans ​ ​to ​ ​commercial​ ​banks,​ ​transferring​ ​the​ ​risk​ ​associated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​loans​ ​and 
providing ​ ​larger ​ ​and ​ ​more ​ ​frequent ​ ​loans​ ​to​ ​borrowers​ ​in​ ​Andhra​ ​Pradesh​ ​(Associated​ ​Press 
2012).   
Here, ​ ​the ​ ​company’s​ ​financial ​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​microloans ​ ​becomes 
evident—interest-bearing​ ​loans ​ ​are ​ ​a​ ​commodity,​ ​or,​ ​in​ ​Marx’s​ ​terms,​ ​capital​ ​as ​ ​commodity.​ ​Kar 
argues ​ ​that ​ ​while ​ ​Marx’s ​ ​original ​ ​analysis​ ​only​ ​accounted​ ​for​ ​credit​ ​exchanges​ ​between 
capitalists, ​ ​contemporary ​ ​models ​ ​of​ ​credit​ ​consistently​ ​lend​ ​to​ ​workers​ ​who​ ​cannot​ ​convert​ ​the 
borrowed ​ ​capital ​ ​into ​ ​commodities.​ ​In ​ ​this ​ ​system, ​ ​the​ ​microloans​ ​circulate​ ​endlessly​ ​without 
ever ​ ​acquiring​ ​a ​ ​use ​ ​value. ​ ​Instead,​ ​value​ ​is​ ​created​ ​through​ ​the​ ​emotional​ ​and​ ​physical​ ​labor​ ​of 
the ​ ​loan ​ ​officer ​ ​and ​ ​the ​ ​financial ​ ​processes​ ​of ​ ​circulation​ ​and​ ​speculation​ ​(Kar ​ ​2013:​ ​483). 
Within ​ ​this ​ ​framework, ​ ​the​ ​microloans​ ​become ​ ​a​ ​new​ ​and​ ​important​ ​source​ ​of ​ ​capital,​ ​and 
borrowers ​ ​become ​ ​consumers​ ​entrenched ​ ​in​ ​a​ ​never-ending​ ​cycle​ ​of​ ​debt.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of 
pooling ​ ​these ​ ​loans​ ​and ​ ​selling ​ ​them​ ​to​ ​other​ ​banks,​ ​the​ ​borrower’s​ ​debt​ ​becomes​ ​further 
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alienated ​ ​and ​ ​abstracted. ​ ​Yet​ ​this​ ​abstraction​ ​is​ ​always​ ​grounded​ ​in​ ​the​ ​fundamentally​ ​relational 
structure ​ ​of ​ ​debt—the​ ​charged ​ ​and ​ ​embodied​ ​relationships​ ​between​ ​borrowers​ ​and​ ​loan​ ​officers. 
Kar ​ ​argues ​ ​that ​ ​“anthropological​ ​work​ ​has​ ​long​ ​identified​ ​the​ ​social​ ​productivity​ ​of​ ​debt​ ​in 
creating ​ ​networks ​ ​of ​ ​obligation”​ ​(Kar​ ​2013:​ ​483).​ ​​ ​Many​ ​scholars ​ ​have​ ​countered​ ​the​ ​totalizing 
and ​ ​abstracted​ ​processes ​ ​of ​ ​credit ​ ​by​ ​demonstrating​ ​the​ ​“intrinsically​ ​cosmological​ ​meaning​ ​of 
financial ​ ​relationships” ​ ​(Kar​ ​2013: ​ ​484).​ ​In​ ​Hyderabad,​ ​we​ ​can​ ​see​ ​how​ ​financial​ ​abstraction​ ​is 
intimately ​ ​linked ​ ​to ​ ​localized ​ ​violence—as ​ ​loans​ ​are​ ​commoditized,​ ​insured​ ​and​ ​abstracted, 
human ​ ​bodies ​ ​become ​ ​a ​ ​significant ​ ​form​ ​of​ ​collateral.   
  Suicide ​ ​became ​ ​more​ ​and​ ​more ​ ​frequent​ ​under​ ​incentivized​ ​growth​ ​and​ ​the​ ​demands​ ​of 
going ​ ​public. ​ ​According ​ ​to ​ ​the ​ ​​Society ​ ​for ​ ​Elimination​ ​of ​ ​Rural ​ ​Poverty, ​ ​​more​ ​than ​ ​70​ ​people 
died ​ ​in ​ ​microfinance ​ ​related​ ​deaths​ ​in ​ ​the​ ​state​ ​of​ ​Andhra​ ​Pradesh​ ​between​ ​March​ ​and​ ​November 
of ​ ​2010 ​ ​(Mohan ​ ​& ​ ​Siddharth​ ​2011: ​ ​5). ​ ​​During ​ ​this​ ​time, ​ ​​SKS​ ​officers ​ ​began​ ​routinely ​ ​handing 
out ​ ​loans ​ ​to ​ ​over-indebted ​ ​borrowers,​ ​without​ ​checking​ ​to​ ​see​ ​if​ ​other​ ​competitors​ ​had​ ​already 
provided ​ ​loans, ​ ​or ​ ​whether ​ ​loans​ ​were​ ​being​ ​used​ ​to​ ​generate​ ​revenue.​ ​Reddy​ ​Subrahmanyam, 
the ​ ​state's ​ ​senior ​ ​rural ​ ​development​ ​official​ ​told​ ​BBC ​ ​"loans​ ​have​ ​been​ ​given​ ​to​ ​rural​ ​people 
without ​ ​checking ​ ​whether​ ​they​ ​had​ ​the​ ​capacity​ ​to​ ​repay" ​ ​(​Biswas ​ ​2010​).​ ​The ​ ​reportedly​ ​cruel 
behavior ​ ​of ​ ​loan ​ ​officers ​ ​in​ ​the​ ​media ​ ​was​ ​extracted​ ​from ​ ​the​ ​larger​ ​context​ ​of ​ ​the 
company—going ​ ​public​ ​on​ ​the​ ​stock ​ ​exchange.​ ​Loan​ ​officers​ ​told​ ​the​ ​Associated​ ​Press​ ​that 
“they ​ ​were ​ ​pressured ​ ​to ​ ​push​ ​more ​ ​debt ​ ​onto​ ​people​ ​than​ ​they​ ​could​ ​handle​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​number 
of ​ ​days ​ ​devoted ​ ​to ​ ​borrower ​ ​training​ ​was​ ​cut​ ​in​ ​half”​ ​(2012).​ ​As​ ​Kar​ ​points​ ​out,​ ​the​ ​loan​ ​officer, 
not ​ ​the ​ ​microfinance ​ ​institutions ​ ​themselves,​ ​were​ ​regularly​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​informal 
money-lenders​ ​who ​ ​were ​ ​routinely​ ​portrayed​ ​in​ ​a​ ​negative​ ​light.​ ​The​ ​money-lender​ ​took 
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advantage ​ ​of ​ ​peasants,​ ​and ​ ​was ​ ​perceived​ ​as​ ​“backward​ ​and​ ​exploitative,​ ​ruled​ ​by​ ​personal 
relations ​ ​and ​ ​high ​ ​interest ​ ​rates, ​ ​while​ ​the​ ​banks ​ ​were​ ​constituted​ ​as​ ​modern,​ ​rational​ ​institutions 
that ​ ​maintained ​ ​market ​ ​based ​ ​and ​ ​competitive​ ​interest​ ​rates”​ ​(Kar​ ​2013:​ ​484).​ ​As​ ​loan​ ​officers 
were ​ ​popularly​ ​equated​ ​with ​ ​money-lenders​ ​and​ ​labeled​ ​as​ ​“loan​ ​sharks,”​ ​the​ ​investors​ ​and 
managers ​ ​of ​ ​SKS ​ ​were ​ ​rarely​ ​criticized.​ ​In​ ​media​ ​reports,​ ​the​ ​critical​ ​story​ ​of ​ ​corporatization 
continually ​ ​took ​ ​a ​ ​back ​ ​seat​ ​to ​ ​the ​ ​horror​ ​stories​ ​of​ ​aggressive​ ​loan​ ​collectors.   
SKS​ ​denied ​ ​that ​ ​they​ ​had​ ​commissioned ​ ​a​ ​private​ ​report​ ​and​ ​to​ ​this​ ​day​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​deny 
responsibility​ ​for ​​ ​the​ ​suicides ​ ​(Associated​ ​Press​ ​2012).​ ​In​ ​a​ ​2011​ ​affidavit​ ​before​ ​India’s 
supreme ​ ​court, ​ ​the​ ​chief ​ ​executive ​ ​of ​ ​SKS,​ ​Mr.​ ​Rao,​ ​claimed​ ​that​ ​company​ ​“is​ ​neither​ ​the​ ​cause 
of ​ ​nor ​ ​responsible ​ ​for​ ​any ​ ​suicides ​ ​in ​ ​the ​ ​state​ ​of ​ ​Andhra​ ​Pradesh”​ ​(Associated​ ​Press​ ​2012). 
Since ​ ​the ​ ​reports, ​ ​however ​ ​SKS ​ ​has ​ ​forced​ ​several​ ​executives​ ​to​ ​resign,​ ​including​ ​the​ ​founder, 
Vikram ​ ​Akula.​ ​Reorganized ​ ​and ​ ​renamed​ ​the​ ​Bharat​ ​Financial​ ​Inclusion​ ​Ltd,​ ​the​ ​company 
continues ​ ​its ​ ​quest​ ​for ​ ​growth. ​ ​SKS’s​ ​history​ ​reveals​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​particular​ ​structure​ ​of 
public ​ ​corporations​ ​demands​ ​constant​ ​growth,​ ​speculation​ ​and​ ​risk.​ ​Under​ ​these​ ​demands,​ ​the 
loan ​ ​becomes ​ ​further ​ ​alienated ​ ​from​ ​the​ ​embodied​ ​reality​ ​of​ ​lending​ ​and​ ​borrowing.​ ​Yet, 
paradoxically,​ ​within ​ ​this ​ ​very ​ ​process ​ ​of​ ​alienation​ ​the​ ​human​ ​body​ ​is​ ​re-figured​ ​as ​ ​collateral 
for ​ ​the ​ ​loan. ​ ​Within ​ ​the ​ ​nexus ​ ​of ​ ​financial​ ​expansion,​ ​abstraction​ ​oriented​ ​towards ​ ​some​ ​kind​ ​of 
corporate ​ ​globality​ ​​depends ​ ​on ​​ ​the ​ ​deeply​ ​physical ​ ​and​ ​situated ​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​indebtedness. 
Constantly ​ ​shifting ​ ​between​ ​scales,​ ​SKS’s​ ​history​ ​in​ ​Hyderabad​ ​exposes​ ​the​ ​multiple​ ​registers​ ​of 
corporate ​ ​expansion—abstraction,​ ​embodiment,​ ​locality,​ ​and​ ​globality.  
​ ​At ​ ​the ​ ​same ​ ​time,​ ​we ​ ​can ​ ​pick​ ​out​ ​significant​ ​moments ​ ​of​ ​resistance​ ​in​ ​this​ ​history.​ ​The 
protest ​ ​in ​ ​2010, ​ ​where​ ​demonstrators​ ​surrounded​ ​the​ ​SKS​ ​corporate​ ​headquarters​ ​in​ ​Hyderabad, 
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reveals ​ ​how ​ ​borrowers ​ ​saw​ ​the​ ​company ​ ​at​ ​large​ ​as​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​the​ ​aggressive​ ​and 
overwhelming ​ ​debt ​ ​conditions, ​ ​not ​ ​just ​ ​the​ ​loan​ ​collectors.​ ​Engaging​ ​in​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​scale-jumping, 
borrowers ​ ​outside ​ ​of ​ ​Hyderabad ​ ​found​ ​it ​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​go​ ​above​ ​the​ ​heads​ ​of​ ​loan​ ​officers​ ​and 
make ​ ​demands​ ​directly ​ ​to ​ ​corporate​ ​managers.​ ​Furthermore,​ ​the​ ​protestors’​ ​threat​ ​to​ ​bring​ ​the 
deceased ​ ​body ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​victim ​ ​into​ ​the​ ​business​ ​offices—the​ ​point​ ​of ​ ​connection​ ​to​ ​abstract 
financial ​ ​markets—brings ​ ​to​ ​light ​ ​the ​ ​profound​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​embodied​ ​realities​ ​constantly 
push ​ ​up ​ ​against ​ ​financial ​ ​alienation.​ ​Finally,​ ​we​ ​must​ ​understand​ ​suicide​ ​as​ ​a​ ​fundamental 
resistance ​ ​to ​ ​a ​ ​system ​ ​that​ ​violently ​ ​demands​ ​income ​ ​generation.​ ​The​ ​taking​ ​of​ ​one’s​ ​own​ ​life​ ​is 
a ​ ​tragic ​ ​reminder ​ ​of ​ ​the ​ ​human​ ​life​ ​at​ ​risk​ ​in​ ​abstracted​ ​and​ ​compounding​ ​systems​ ​of​ ​debt.  
 
Making ​ ​a ​ ​Credit ​ ​Subject: ​ ​the ​ ​2014 ​ ​Advertising​ ​Campaign  
On ​ ​BFIL’s ​ ​home ​ ​page, ​ ​an​ ​Indian​ ​woman ​ ​wearing​ ​a​ ​blue​ ​and​ ​orange​ ​sari​ ​smiles.​ ​Next​ ​to 
her ​ ​a ​ ​white ​ ​text ​ ​box ​ ​shows ​ ​the ​ ​“current ​ ​outreach”​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of ​ ​the​ ​numbers​ ​of​ ​borrowers, 
branches, ​ ​and ​ ​the ​ ​amounts ​ ​disbursed.​ ​The​ ​numbers ​ ​increase​ ​rapidly,​ ​expanding​ ​against​ ​the​ ​static 
image ​ ​of ​ ​a ​ ​smiling ​ ​borrower. ​ ​Standing ​ ​in ​ ​for ​ ​all​ ​borrowers,​ ​this​ ​woman​ ​signifies​ ​and 
consolidates ​ ​the ​ ​company’s ​ ​idea​ ​of ​ ​a​ ​“worthy”​ ​credit​ ​subject.​ ​The​ ​image​ ​of​ ​this ​ ​subject, 
produced ​ ​and ​ ​reproduced ​ ​on ​ ​their​ ​website​ ​and​ ​in​ ​their​ ​2014​ ​advertising​ ​campaign,​ ​constantly 
translates ​ ​between ​ ​local ​ ​and​ ​global ​​ ​scales ​ ​to​ ​discipline​ ​borrowers ​ ​and​ ​attract​ ​wealthy 
transnational ​ ​investors. ​ ​As ​ ​was ​ ​pointed ​ ​out​ ​earlier,​ ​the​ ​very​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​microfinance​ ​operates 
through ​ ​a ​ ​kind​ ​of ​ ​scale-making ​ ​where​ ​local​ ​culture​ ​is​ ​taken​ ​up​ ​and​ ​mobilized​ ​through 
transnational ​ ​finance ​ ​to ​ ​produce​ ​new​ ​local​ ​consumers ​ ​of​ ​credit​ ​while​ ​connecting​ ​them ​ ​to​ ​broader 
financial ​ ​networks ​ ​(Elyachar​ ​2002: ​ ​510).​ ​In​ ​this​ ​section,​ ​I​ ​will​ ​examine​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​BFIL 
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attempts ​ ​to ​ ​produce ​ ​and ​ ​discipline ​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​“local”​ ​client​ ​that​ ​is ​ ​both​ ​gendered​ ​and 
classed, ​ ​while​ ​also​ ​showing ​ ​the ​ ​ways​ ​in ​ ​which​ ​the​ ​formation​ ​and​ ​visibility​ ​of ​ ​this​ ​subject 
operates ​ ​on ​ ​several​ ​levels ​ ​to​ ​reach ​ ​local​ ​and​ ​transnational​ ​audiences.   
First ​ ​let ​ ​us ​ ​consider​ ​how​ ​SKS​ ​mobilizes​ ​the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​locality.​ ​Unlike​ ​more​ ​centralized 
institutional ​ ​development ​ ​strategies​ ​like ​ ​structural​ ​adjustment​ ​programs ​ ​(SAPs),​ ​microfinance 
capitalizes ​ ​on​ ​the ​ ​existing ​ ​informal​ ​structures​ ​of ​ ​local​ ​communities.​ ​Julia​ ​Elychar​ ​writes​ ​about 
microfinance:​ ​“It ​ ​is ​ ​about ​ ​people ​ ​and ​ ​their ​ ​cultural​ ​practice,​ ​not​ ​about​ ​buildings​ ​or ​ ​formal 
institutions” ​ ​(2002: ​ ​502). ​ ​In​ ​microfinance ​ ​frameworks,​ ​local​ ​or​ ​traditional​ ​practices​ ​that​ ​have 
historically ​ ​been ​ ​framed ​ ​in​ ​development​ ​discourse​ ​as​ ​obstacles​ ​to​ ​development​ ​are​ ​re-classified 
as ​ ​valuable, ​ ​revenue-generating ​ ​activities.​ ​Further,​ ​Elychar​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​these​ ​local​ ​cultural​ ​and 
social ​ ​relations ​ ​are ​ ​seen ​ ​by​ ​MFIs ​ ​as​ ​“a​ ​free​ ​resource​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​tapped​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​that​ ​the​ ​poor 
provide ​ ​for ​ ​themselves” ​ ​(2002: ​ ​512).​ ​In​ ​this​ ​way,​ ​SKS​ ​consistently​ ​takes​ ​up​ ​some​ ​form​ ​of​ ​“local 
culture” ​ ​as ​ ​means ​ ​to ​ ​discipline​ ​new​ ​blocks​ ​of​ ​consumers ​ ​and​ ​“connect”​ ​them ​ ​to​ ​a​ ​transnational 
financial ​ ​network.  
For ​ ​BFIL, ​ ​this ​ ​new ​ ​block​ ​of​ ​consumers ​ ​is​ ​exclusively​ ​“poor​ ​women​ ​in​ ​villages ​ ​or​ ​urban 
colonies” ​ ​(BFIL ​ ​2009:​ ​“Homepage”).​ ​The​ ​company​ ​explicitly​ ​mobilizes​ ​the​ ​rhetoric​ ​of​ ​poverty 
to ​ ​imagine ​ ​their ​ ​ideal ​ ​consumers. ​ ​​On ​ ​their ​ ​website,​ ​the​ ​company ​ ​claims​ ​that​ ​their​ ​objective​ ​is​ ​to 
“build ​ ​a ​ ​culture ​ ​of​ ​credit ​ ​discipline” ​ ​in​ ​“poor ​ ​areas”​ ​(BFIL​ ​2009:​ ​“Our​ ​Work”).​ ​They​ ​begin​ ​with 
a ​ ​fundamental​ ​belief ​ ​that ​ ​the ​ ​poor ​ ​are ​ ​credit​ ​worthy.​ ​“The​ ​poor,”​ ​they​ ​write,​ ​“have​ ​proved 
themselves ​ ​to​ ​be ​ ​productive​ ​and​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​borrowing,​ ​saving​ ​and​ ​repaying,​ ​even​ ​without 
collateral” ​ ​(BFIL ​ ​“Our ​ ​Work”).​ ​​ ​For​ ​BFIL,​ ​the​ ​poor​ ​have​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​to​ ​become​ ​indebted 
subjects—trustworthy ​ ​consumers​ ​of ​ ​financial​ ​tools.​ ​Arturo​ ​Escobar​ ​encourages​ ​us​ ​to​ ​think​ ​about 
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“the ​ ​poor” ​ ​in ​ ​development ​ ​discourse​ ​as ​ ​a​ ​historically​ ​situated​ ​and​ ​discursive​ ​construction.​ ​This 
construction, ​ ​he ​ ​argues, ​ ​allows ​ ​specifically​ ​for​ ​“the​ ​nascent​ ​order​ ​of​ ​capitalism​ ​and​ ​modernity” 
to ​ ​“not ​ ​only ​ ​create​ ​consumers ​ ​but ​ ​to​ ​transform ​ ​society​ ​by​ ​turning​ ​the​ ​poor​ ​into​ ​objects​ ​of 
knowledge ​ ​and ​ ​management” ​ ​(Escobar ​ ​1995:​ ​23).​ ​​This​ ​management​ ​of ​ ​poverty​ ​has​ ​and 
continues ​ ​to ​ ​justify ​ ​colonial​ ​interventions ​ ​in​ ​education,​ ​health,​ ​morality,​ ​employment​ ​and​ ​so​ ​on 
(Escobar ​ ​1995:​ ​23).​ ​In​ ​BFIL’s ​ ​description​ ​of​ ​their​ ​process​ ​of​ ​training​ ​new​ ​borrowers,​ ​it​ ​becomes 
clear ​ ​that ​ ​they ​ ​too​ ​consider​ ​“the​ ​poor” ​ ​an ​ ​object​ ​that​ ​can​ ​be​ ​known​ ​and​ ​managed.  
On ​ ​their ​ ​“Methodology” ​ ​page,​ ​BFIL’s​ ​strategy​ ​for​ ​knowing​ ​and​ ​managing​ ​the​ ​poor​ ​is 
explicitly ​ ​laid ​ ​out. ​ ​They ​ ​begin ​ ​the ​ ​process​ ​by​ ​selecting​ ​a​ ​“village”​ ​and​ ​training​ ​new​ ​groups​ ​of 
borrowers: ​ ​“Before​ ​starting​ ​operations,​ ​company​ ​employees ​ ​conduct​ ​village​ ​surveys​ ​to​ ​evaluate 
local ​ ​conditions ​ ​like ​ ​population,​ ​poverty​ ​level,​ ​road​ ​accessibility,​ ​political​ ​stability​ ​and​ ​means​ ​of 
livelihood” ​ ​(BFIL ​ ​2009: ​ ​“Methodology”).​ ​The​ ​use​ ​of​ ​the​ ​term ​ ​“village”​ ​as ​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​process​ ​of 
site-specific ​ ​knowledge ​ ​gathering​ ​re-enforces​ ​the​ ​company’s​ ​commitment​ ​to​ ​what​ ​they​ ​consider 
“the ​ ​local”. ​ ​Once ​ ​the ​ ​company ​ ​gathers​ ​this​ ​knowledge,​ ​they​ ​begin​ ​their​ ​Compulsory​ ​Group 
Training ​ ​(CGT). ​ ​The ​ ​training​ ​is​ ​a ​ ​two-day​ ​process​ ​“designed​ ​to​ ​educate​ ​clients​ ​on​ ​BFIL’s 
processes ​ ​and ​ ​procedures,​ ​and​ ​build ​ ​a​ ​culture​ ​of​ ​credit​ ​discipline”​ ​(BFIL ​ ​2009:​ ​“Our 
Methodology”). ​ ​The​ ​members​ ​are​ ​then​ ​given​ ​small​ ​loans​ ​to​ ​“inculcate​ ​the​ ​habit​ ​of ​ ​daily​ ​savings, 
credit ​ ​and ​ ​center ​ ​discipline”​ ​(Ibid.)​ ​The​ ​loans​ ​are​ ​then​ ​systematically​ ​scaled​ ​up​ ​as​ ​members 
prove ​ ​themselves ​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​handling​ ​larger​ ​loans.​ ​This​ ​environment​ ​of ​ ​“discipline”​ ​is ​ ​extended 
to ​ ​all ​ ​subsequent ​ ​meetings:​ ​“Centre​ ​meetings​ ​are​ ​conducted​ ​with​ ​rigid​ ​discipline​ ​to​ ​sustain​ ​the 
environment ​ ​of ​ ​credit​ ​discipline​ ​created​ ​during​ ​CGT”​ ​(Ibid.)​ ​The​ ​explicit​ ​cultivation​ ​of 
“discipline” ​ ​that ​ ​applies ​ ​not​ ​only ​ ​to​ ​monetary​ ​exchanges,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​interpersonal​ ​exchanges, 
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reveals ​ ​the ​ ​way ​ ​in ​ ​which ​ ​BFIL’s​ ​training​ ​goes​ ​beyond​ ​simply​ ​handling​ ​loans.​ ​Instead,​ ​the 
company ​ ​wants​ ​to ​ ​produce​ ​a ​ ​new ​ ​set ​ ​of ​ ​indebted​ ​and​ ​obedient​ ​consumers,​ ​sell​ ​their 
commoditized​ ​debt, ​ ​and ​ ​continue​ ​the​ ​cycle.  
While​ ​the ​ ​discursive​ ​category ​ ​of​ ​“the ​ ​poor”​ ​can​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​one​ ​way​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the 
company ​ ​conceptualizes ​ ​and ​ ​legitimates​ ​their​ ​relationship​ ​with​ ​borrowers,​ ​the​ ​company​ ​also 
mobilizes ​ ​gender ​ ​distinctions ​ ​as​ ​a ​ ​way ​ ​to ​ ​authenticate​ ​their​ ​lending​ ​relationship.​ ​Lending 
exclusively ​ ​to​ ​women,​ ​the ​ ​company ​ ​cultivates​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​gendered​ ​subject.​ ​In​ ​her​ ​study​ ​of​ ​gender 
and ​ ​microfinance ​ ​in ​ ​Paraguay, ​ ​​Caroline​ ​Schuster ​ ​points​ ​out​ ​that ​ ​a​ ​key​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​microfinance,​ ​“is 
the ​ ​pervasive ​ ​assumption​ ​that ​ ​women​ ​are​ ​more​ ​responsible​ ​borrowers ​ ​than​ ​men​ ​and​ ​also​ ​that 
they ​ ​are ​ ​more​ ​likely ​ ​to ​ ​pass​ ​along ​ ​their​ ​gains​ ​to​ ​their ​ ​children​ ​and​ ​families”​ ​(Schuster​ ​2014: 
564). ​ ​Further,​ ​in ​ ​development ​ ​discourse,​ ​Elyachar​ ​observes​ ​that​ ​women​ ​tend​ ​to​ ​represent​ ​the 
untapped, ​ ​informal​ ​economies ​ ​that ​ ​impoverished​ ​communities​ ​are​ ​thought​ ​to​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​(Elyachar 
2002: ​ ​496). ​ ​It​ ​is ​ ​precisely ​ ​this​ ​aspect ​ ​of ​ ​microfinance—the​ ​idea​ ​of​ ​female​ ​responsibility​ ​and 
empowerment—that​ ​has ​ ​made​ ​microcredit​ ​so​ ​appealing​ ​within​ ​international​ ​discourses​ ​of 
development. ​ ​In ​ ​line ​ ​with ​ ​the ​ ​emancipatory​ ​ideals​ ​of​ ​second-wave​ ​feminism ​ ​that​ ​focused​ ​on 
women’s ​ ​empowerment​ ​through ​ ​economic​ ​independence,​ ​microfinance​ ​agencies ​ ​have 
consistently ​ ​appropriated​ ​feminist ​ ​language​ ​as​ ​a​ ​means​ ​to​ ​legitimate​ ​the​ ​indebting​ ​of 
impoverished ​ ​women ​ ​(Schuster ​ ​2014:​ ​564-566).​ ​By​ ​taking​ ​up​ ​specific​ ​discursive​ ​categories​ ​like 
the ​ ​poor, ​ ​women, ​ ​and ​ ​local,​ ​SKS​ ​produces​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​client​ ​that​ ​is​ ​always​ ​tethered​ ​to 
imagined ​ ​ideas ​ ​of ​ ​the​ ​local,​ ​while ​ ​also​ ​always​ ​moving​ ​towards​ ​the​ ​global​ ​through​ ​the​ ​use​ ​of 
financial ​ ​tools. 
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Posted​ ​on ​ ​YouTube,​ ​BFIL’s​ ​2014 ​ ​advertising​ ​video,​ ​"Four​ ​members​ ​speak​ ​about​ ​SKS 
Microfinance ​ ​Limited,” ​ ​interviews ​ ​four​ ​rural​ ​women​ ​from ​ ​different​ ​parts​ ​of​ ​India.​ ​This​ ​video 
highlights ​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​company​ ​mobilizes ​ ​locality,​ ​gender​ ​and​ ​class.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​video,​ ​the 
members ​ ​are ​ ​hyper-contextualized ​ ​within​ ​their​ ​local​ ​communities.​ ​As​ ​each​ ​woman​ ​appears​ ​on 
screen, ​ ​a ​ ​text​ ​appears​ ​next ​ ​to ​ ​her ​ ​that ​ ​details​ ​her ​ ​name,​ ​village,​ ​district,​ ​state,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​length​ ​of 
time ​ ​since ​ ​she ​ ​joined​ ​SKS. ​ ​Either ​ ​in​ ​their ​ ​homes​ ​or​ ​recently​ ​built​ ​shops,​ ​the​ ​women​ ​are 
strategically ​ ​positioned ​ ​next​ ​to​ ​their ​ ​entrepreneurial​ ​business​ ​built​ ​from ​ ​SKS​ ​loans.​ ​Emphasizing 
the ​ ​‘localness’ ​ ​of ​ ​SKS​ ​practices,​ ​one​ ​woman​ ​states,​ ​“SKS​ ​officers ​ ​speak​ ​in​ ​the​ ​local​ ​language. 
They ​ ​are ​ ​always ​ ​polite​ ​and ​ ​address ​ ​the ​ ​members​ ​only​ ​as ​ ​Amma​ ​or​ ​Sister”​ ​(BFIL ​ ​Videos​ ​2014: 
1:44, ​ ​4:16). ​ ​And ​ ​another ​ ​says: ​ ​“For ​ ​our ​ ​benefit,​ ​all​ ​center​ ​meetings ​ ​take​ ​place​ ​early​ ​in​ ​the 
morning” ​ ​(BFIL ​ ​Videos ​ ​2014:​ ​1:26, ​ ​4:16)​ ​While​ ​establishing​ ​local​ ​specificity,​ ​the​ ​video​ ​also 
works ​ ​to ​ ​homogenize ​ ​the ​ ​members. ​ ​As​ ​the​ ​women​ ​speak,​ ​they​ ​become​ ​increasingly​ ​uniform. 
Instead ​ ​of ​ ​talking ​ ​about ​ ​their ​ ​individual​ ​experiences​ ​with​ ​microfinance,​ ​they​ ​each​ ​inform​ ​the 
viewer ​ ​of ​ ​one ​ ​procedural ​ ​aspect ​ ​of ​ ​microfinance.​ ​Exceedingly​ ​bureaucratic,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the 
women’s ​ ​statements ​ ​are ​ ​almost​ ​direct ​ ​translations​ ​from ​ ​SKS’s​ ​website.​ ​While​ ​gesturing​ ​at​ ​some 
kind ​ ​of ​ ​locality, ​ ​the ​ ​video ​ ​generalizes ​ ​and ​ ​consolidates ​ ​each​ ​individual​ ​into​ ​a​ ​larger ​ ​abstract 
demographic. 
Together, ​ ​the ​ ​members ​ ​represent​ ​SKS’s ​ ​idealized​ ​and​ ​disciplined​ ​subject—a ​ ​poor, 
“traditional,”​ ​Indian ​ ​woman.​ ​In​ ​generalizing​ ​this​ ​group​ ​of​ ​women,​ ​SKS​ ​not​ ​only​ ​attempts​ ​to 
attract ​ ​new ​ ​members ​ ​and​ ​foreign​ ​investors,​ ​the​ ​company​ ​also​ ​makes​ ​a​ ​claim​ ​about​ ​what 
constitutes ​ ​the ​ ​traditional ​ ​“Indian”​ ​woman.​ ​These​ ​kinds​ ​of​ ​nationalizing​ ​statements​ ​are 
particularly ​ ​meaningful ​ ​in ​ ​a​ ​country​ ​whose​ ​violent​ ​colonial​ ​history​ ​has​ ​worked​ ​to​ ​heighten 
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tensions ​ ​between ​ ​dominant ​ ​Hindu​ ​factions​ ​and​ ​minority​ ​religious ​ ​and​ ​ethnic​ ​groups.​ ​The​ ​fact 
that ​ ​each ​ ​woman ​ ​wears​ ​a ​ ​bindi, ​ ​for ​ ​example,​ ​reinforces​ ​a​ ​specific​ ​identity​ ​within​ ​a​ ​highly 
pluralistic ​ ​country. ​ ​While ​ ​some​ ​Indian​ ​women​ ​who​ ​do​ ​not​ ​consider​ ​themselves​ ​Hindu​ ​wear ​ ​a 
bindi, ​ ​the ​ ​sign ​ ​is ​ ​historically ​ ​associated ​ ​with​ ​Hinduism. ​ ​As​ ​such,​ ​many​ ​Indian​ ​Muslim​ ​women 
and ​ ​women ​ ​of ​ ​other​ ​non-Hindu​ ​cultures​ ​do​ ​not​ ​wear​ ​them.​ ​In​ ​referencing​ ​the​ ​local,​ ​yet 
generalizing ​ ​the ​ ​women ​ ​into​ ​a ​ ​stereotypical​ ​category​ ​of​ ​traditional​ ​“Indian”​ ​women,​ ​the​ ​video 
enacts ​ ​a ​ ​version ​ ​of​ ​what ​ ​William ​ ​Mazzarella​ ​calls​ ​“the​ ​cultural​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​globalization 
(Mazzarella ​ ​2003: ​ ​183). ​ ​​ ​Here ​ ​cultural ​ ​difference​ ​and​ ​local​ ​specificities​ ​are​ ​abstracted​ ​and 
subsequently ​ ​“confirmed ​ ​and​ ​redeemed ​ ​in​ ​a​ ​higher​ ​global​ ​unity”​ ​(Mazzarella​ ​2003:​ ​184).​ ​In​ ​this 
process, ​ ​cultural ​ ​difference​ ​is ​ ​generalized ​ ​into​ ​a​ ​single​ ​notion​ ​of ​ ​“Indianness.”​ ​Through​ ​the 
generalization​ ​of ​ ​local ​ ​specificity,​ ​the​ ​video​ ​transcends ​ ​embodied​ ​locality​ ​and​ ​reconstitutes​ ​a 
new ​ ​generic ​ ​locality ​ ​that ​ ​operates ​ ​in​ ​a ​ ​transnational​ ​marketplace.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​translation​ ​between 
scales, ​ ​the ​ ​advertisement ​ ​mirrors ​ ​its ​ ​financial​ ​model—corporate​ ​abstraction​ ​seizes ​ ​upon​ ​a 
localized ​ ​subject ​ ​and ​ ​re-consolidates​ ​their​ ​subjecthood​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​sell​ ​their​ ​alienated​ ​debt​ ​to 
“global” ​ ​investors ​ ​while ​ ​further​ ​indebting​ ​“local”​ ​clients. 
   
Conclusion 
Bringing ​ ​together ​ ​a​ ​set​ ​of ​ ​histories,​ ​discourses​ ​and​ ​images,​ ​I​ ​have​ ​attempted​ ​to​ ​examine 
the ​ ​various ​ ​ways ​ ​in​ ​which​ ​one​ ​microfinance​ ​company​ ​in​ ​India​ ​has ​ ​taken​ ​up​ ​and​ ​worked​ ​between 
the ​ ​rhetorical​ ​scales ​ ​of ​ ​“local”​ ​and​ ​“global.”​ ​In​ ​their ​ ​practice​ ​and​ ​representation,​ ​BFIL​ ​constantly 
makes ​ ​and ​ ​remakes​ ​these​ ​scales​ ​in ​ ​order​ ​to​ ​discipline​ ​and​ ​consolidate​ ​the​ ​subjecthood​ ​of 
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borrowers ​ ​and ​ ​present ​ ​it ​ ​to ​ ​a​ ​transnational​ ​audience.​ ​In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​think​ ​about​ ​their​ ​scale​ ​making,​ ​I 
have ​ ​argued​ ​that ​ ​we​ ​must​ ​examine ​ ​the ​ ​specific​ ​histories​ ​and​ ​practices​ ​of​ ​globalist​ ​projects.​ ​In​ ​the 
case ​ ​of ​ ​SKS, ​ ​that ​ ​means ​ ​sorting​ ​through​ ​their​ ​violent​ ​and​ ​exploitative​ ​operations,​ ​their 
manipulation ​ ​of ​ ​globalist ​ ​rhetoric,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​significant​ ​moments​ ​of ​ ​resistance​ ​to​ ​microfinance 
programs. ​ ​In ​ ​SKS’s​ ​history,​ ​I ​ ​have ​ ​located​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​tension​ ​between​ ​corporate​ ​abstraction 
and ​ ​the ​ ​embodied ​ ​condition ​ ​of ​ ​indebtedness.​ ​This​ ​tension​ ​is​ ​then​ ​replicated​ ​in​ ​the​ ​rhetorical 
pairing ​ ​of ​ ​imagined ​ ​ideas ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​local ​ ​and​ ​the​ ​global​ ​that​ ​are​ ​consistently​ ​produced​ ​in​ ​their 
advertisements ​ ​to ​ ​conceptualize​ ​and​ ​discipline​ ​new​ ​sets​ ​of​ ​consumers.​ ​Always ​ ​​shifting​ ​from ​ ​a 
localized ​ ​and ​ ​grounded​ ​community ​ ​to​ ​an​ ​abstract​ ​‘global’​ ​financial​ ​world,​ ​the​ ​project​ ​of 
microfinance ​ ​exerts ​ ​power ​ ​through ​ ​its ​ ​shifting​ ​scales.​ ​As​ ​the​ ​company​ ​continues ​ ​their​ ​process​ ​of 
financialization ​ ​in​ ​poor ​ ​areas, ​ ​more​ ​and​ ​more​ ​people​ ​become ​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​the​ ​abstracted​ ​demands 
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